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Jurado: AFDC Benefits

NOTE

ANDERSON v. EDWARDS: CAN TWO LIVE
MORE CHEAPLY THAN ONE? THE EFFECT
OF COHABITATION ON AFDC GRANTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Anderson v. Edwards/ several federal courts and state courts
of last resort were divided as to whether federal law governing
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children2 (hereinafter
"AFDC") program prohibited a state from grouping into a single AFDC Assistance Unie (hereinafter "AU") all needy children who live in the same household under the care of one
relative. 4 Although the Ninth Circuit had previously held oth-

1. Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291 (1995) (Thomas, J. delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court), cert. granted, Edwards v. Healy, 12 F.3d 154 (9th
Cir. 1993), and rev'd.
2. 42 V.S.C.A. § 602(a)(38) (West Supp. 1995).
3. 45 C.F.R. § 206.1O(b)(5) (1994). The full text of the statute reads: "Assis·
tance Unit is the group of individuals whose income, resources and needs are
considered as a unit for purposes of determining eligibility and the amount of
payment." [d.
4. The courts divided on this issued were: Edwards v. Healy, 12 F.3d 154
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted sub nom. Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 41 (1994),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1291 (1995); Beaton v. Thompson, 913 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1990)
(relying on McCoog v. Hegstrom, 690 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1982», affd, 528 F.
Supp. 575 (D. Or. 1981), and Gurley v. Wohlgemuth, 421 F. Supp. 1337 (N.E.D.
Pa. 1976) (holding that the state regulation violated federal law); Bray v. Dowling,
25 F.3d 135 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1431 (1995); Wilkes v. Gomez,
32 F.3d 1324 (8th Cir. 1994), rev'd, Wilkes v. Steffen, 831 F. Supp. 723 (1993),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1431(1995); Morrell v. Flaherty, 449 S.E.2d 175 (N.C.
1994), rev'd, 432 S.E.2d 364 (N.C. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Morrell v. Britt,
115 S. Ct. 2278 (1995); and Macinnes v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 593
N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1992) (holding that the state law did not violate federal law).
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erwise,5 in Anderson the Supreme Court held that California's
non-sibling filing unit rule 6 (hereinafter "California Rule")
does not violate federallaw. 7
When their monthly AFDC allowance was reduced, the
plaintiffs in Anderson filed a class action lawsuitS against the
California officials who administered the AFDC program. 9
Pursuant to the California Rule, a reduction in an AFDC
monthly allowance occurs when two or more AUs, for which
there is only one caretaker, are combined into one. lO Under
the California Rule, the amount of the assistance increases
with each additional recipient, but it does not increase proportionally.ll As the number of persons in the AU increases, the
per capita payment to the AU decreases. 12
Respondents in Anderson argued that the California Rule
violated three federal regulations 13 which prohibited states
from assuming that a cohabitant's income is available to a
needy child absent a case-specific determination that such
income is actually or legally available. 14 The Supreme Court
held that the California Rule does not violate federal law because those federal regulations apply to a boyfriend or other

5. Edwards, 12 F.3d at 154; Beaton, 913 F.2d at 701.
6. Cal. Dept. of Social Servs., Manual of Policies & Procedures § 82-824.1.13.
[hereinafter MPP § 82-824.1.13]. The California regulation states in relevant part:
"[T]wo or more AUs in the same home shall be combined into one AU when: . . .
[T]here is only one caretaker relative." [d.
7. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1291.
8. The class action suit included all AFDC households with siblings and nonsibling children who are consolidated into a single unit for purposes of calculating
AFDC benefits. This action was brought by Verna Edwards, for herself and as
guardian ad litem for Vernais Edwards, Pamela Edwards, and Ericka Edwards;
Barbara Moore, for herself and as guardian ad litem for Rebiana Robi, Derral
Robi, Delisha Jaa, and Rayleisha Taylor; and Vanessa Hamilton, for herself and as
guardian ad litem for Johnny Watson, Cleo Thomas, Ricky MacDonald, Jimmy
Pashell, and Stanley Hamilton. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at I, Anderson (No.
93-1883).
9. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1291.
10. [d.
11. [d. at 1294.
12. [d.
13. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1291. 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1993),
233.20(a)(2)(viii) (1993), and 233.90(a)(1) (1993). See infra note 175 for the relevant
text of these regulations.
14. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1293.
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adult male in the home who has no legal obligation to the
children and whose income should not be assumed to be available to them. 15 The California Rule does not presume that
income from a non-legally responsible person, who lives in the
household but is not part of the AFDC AU, is available to the
AFDC recipients. 16 California takes into consideration only
the income of the members in the AU, which is authorized by
the federal AFDC statute. 17 Therefore, the Court held that
federal law does not prohibit California from grouping into a
single AU all needy children living in the same household
under the care of one relative. IS
This note will first discuss the background of the AFDC
program and how it is regulated by the federal and state governments. A discussion of several lower federal and state court
decisions which have dealt with the issue presented to the
United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Edwards will
follow. Next, this note will examine the Court's analysis and
holding in Anderson. The note concludes with the author's
assessment as to why the holding in Anderson was correct.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN
PROGRAM

AFDC 19 was created to provide cash income support to
needy children who are deprived of the support of at least one
of their parents. 20 Congress created the AFDC program in
1935 to:
[E]ncourag[e] the care of dependent children in

15. Id. at 1298. See also, Linda Greenhouse, Ruling on Definition of 'Family,'
Justices Back a Welfare Curb, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at A-32.
16. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 9, Anderson (No. 93-1883).
17. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1297-1298. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(7)(A) (1988 ed. and
Supp. V). See also, Cal. Dept. of Social Servs., Manual of Policies & Procedures §
82-820.3 (indicating who must be included in the AU).
18. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1293.
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(38) (West Supp. 1995).
20. State AFDC Rules Regarding the Treatment of Cohabitors: 1993; Aid to
Families with Dependant Children, 57 SOC. SEC. BULL., Dec. 22, 1994, at 26 [hereinafter SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN].
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their own homes or in the homes of relatives by
enabling each state to furnish financial assistance ... as far as practicable under the conditions in such state, to needy dependent children
and the parents or relatives with whom they are
living to help maintain and strengthen family
life and to help such parents or relatives to
attain or retain capability for the maximum selfsupport and personal independence consistent
with the maintenance of continuing parental
care and protection ....21

The program is a cooperative federal-state public assistance program. 22 It is financed largely by the federal government, on a matching fund basis, and is administered by the
states. 23 States are not required to participate in the program,
but states that desire to take advantage of the substantial
federal funds available for distribution to needy children are
required to submit an AFDC plan for approval by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (previously known as the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; hereinafter
"HHS,,).24 In order for the state plan to be approved, it must
conform with the requirements of Subchapter IV(A) of the
Social Security Act,25 and with the rules and regulations promulgated by HHS.26 If HHS does not approve the state plan,
federal funds will not be made available for its implementation. 27
HHS has issued two separate Action Transmittals which
indicate that the states have discretion to decide whether to

21. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
22. Bray v. Dowling, 25 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Anderson v.
Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291, 1294 (1995); Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 189
(1985).
23. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
24. [d. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-604 (West 1991). The Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare was redesignated the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare or any other official
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was redesignated the Secretary or official, of Health and Human Services on May 4, 1980. 20 U.S.C. § 3508
(1994).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-617 (West 1991).
26. HEW, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, §§ 2200, 2300,
cited in King, 392 U.S. at 316.
27. King, 392 U.S. at 316. See 42 U.S.C.A. §601 (West 1991).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/3

4

Jurado: AFDC Benefits

1996]

AFDC BENEFITS

305

combine all children in the household, sibling or non-sibling,
into one AFDC unit. 28 On January 13, 1986, HHS issued an
Action Transmittal which stated that "outside of [the mandatory family filing rule, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38)] it is up to the
State to establish policy on the number of assistance units in
the household, e.g., when an individual not related to a member of the assistance unit as a parent, brother or sister lives in
the household and files for assistance."29 Another Action
Transmittal issued on March 16, 199430 indicated that the
states have authority to exercise their discretion to either consolidate non-siblings into the existing AU or allow the nonsiblings to be kept in a separate AU.31

B. DEFINING THE AsSISTANCE UNIT
1. Statutory Definition
As part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,32 Congress
amended the Sodal Security Ace3 to require that parents and
siblings (as well as grandparents in the case of a minor parent)
who live in the same household with an AFDC beneficiary be
consolidated into a single AFDC AU. 34 However, no statute or

28. Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17-18, Anderson (No. 93-1883).
29.Id.
30. This Action Transmittal was issued after the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Edwards, 12 F.3d 154 (9th Cir. 1993).
31. Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17-18, Anderson (93-1883).
Action Transmittal ACF-AT-94-6 states in relevant part:
Apart from complying with these two Federal requirements [the family filing unit rule, and the rule which
requires consolidation when a person is required to be in
two or more assistance units], States are authorized to set
the State-wide policy, to be applied to all cases, whether
and under what conditions two or more assistance units
in the same household are to be consolidated or retained
as separate units.
Id. at 18.
32. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1991).
34. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 2640(a), 98 Stat. 1145 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) and (39) (1991)). This statute states in relevant part:
(A) any parent of such child, and
(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or
sister meets the conditions described in clause (1) and (2)
of section 606 (a) of this title or in section 607(a), if such
parent, brother, or sister is living in the same home as
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regulatory provision expressly addresses the question of whether a single relative caretaker receiving AFDC who takes in
minor dependent children for whom she is not legally responsible shouldn be deemed a single AFDC AU?35
AFDC payments vary depending on the size of the AU
under the economies of scale principle. 3s Thus, grant amounts
increase incrementally for each additional AU member. 37 As a
result, it is important to determine who is included in the AU
since this determines the amount of the grant. 3S The "family
filing unit rule,,39 requires that all cohabiting nuclear family

the dependent child, and any income of or available for
such parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such determination and applying such paragraph with
respect to the family (notwithstanding section 405(j) of
this title, in the case of benefits provided under subchapter II of this chapter).
[d.
45 C.F.R. § 206.1O(a)(I)(vii) (1994) states in relevant part:
(a) State plan requirements. A State plan under title . . .
IV-A . . . , of that Social Security Act shall provide that:
(1) Each individual wishing to do so shall have the opportunity to apply for assistance under the plan without
delay. Under this requirement: (viii) For AFDC only, in
order for the family to be eligible, an application with
respect to a dependent child must also include, if living
in the same household and otherwise eligible for assistance:
(A) Any natural or adoptive parent, or stepparent (in the
case of States with laws of general applicability); and (B)
Any blood-related or adoptive brother or sister ...
[d.
Prior to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, AFDC applicants living in the same
household could choose to exclude from the assistance unit a parent or child who,
for example, had significant income or resources that if counted among the
family's resources would render the family ineligible for assistance. Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 590 (1987).
35. Bray, 25 F.3d at 141. See also, Allen v. Hettleman, 494 F. Supp. 854, 861
(D. Md. 1980) (quoting with approval pre-1984 statement of then Secretary of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services: "The composition of an
AFDC assistance unit is not defined in federal law.").
36. Macinnes v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 593 N.E.2d 222, 224 (Mass.
1992). The economies of scale principle is based on the proposition that individuals
living with others usually have reduced per capita costs because many of their
expenses are shared. Termini v. Califano, 611 F.2d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd,
464 F. Supp. 797 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
37. [d.
38. Beaton v. Thompson, 913 F.2d 701, 702 (9th Cir. 1990).
39. See supra note 3.
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members be grouped into a single AFDC "assistance unit,"
which is defined by federal law as "the group of individuals
whose income, resources and needs are considered as a unit for
purposes of determining eligibility and the amount of payment."40
2. Practical Meaning of "Family Unit"
Most AFDC families include a caretaker adult,41 usually
the mother of the children, as well as the children. 42 Although
AFDC families were relatively easy to identify when the Social
Security Act (which included legislation for the AFDC program) was passed in 1935,43 they are now more difficult to
define. 44 Today, the types of families and households within
which needy children reside have become more complex. 45 It
has become more common to find AFDC recipients living with
their parents, with other family members, or to have AFDC
mothers married to men who are not the natural parents of
the children. 46
3. California's Non-sibling Filing-Unit Rule
Pursuant to the federal AFDC legislation,47 California has
enacted programs for public aid to families with dependent
children. 48 The State Department of Social Services (hereinafter "DHHS") is the state agency responsible for supervising the
administration of the AFDC program. 49 Grants-in-aid are

40. Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291, 1294 (1995) (citing 45 C.F.R. §
206.10(b)(5) (1993)).
41. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(v) (1994).
42. SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, supra note 20.
43. [d.
44. [d.
45. [d.
46. [d.

47. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-687 (West 1991).
48. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11200-11523 (Deering 1994).
49. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10554, 10600 (Deering 1994). The administration of the state AFDC program is divided into the several counties within the
state and is designated a county function and responsibility. The management of
the program in each of the counties rests upon the boards of supervisors in the
respective counties pursuant to the applicable state and federal laws. CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 10800 (Deering 1994).
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made to the states' county agencies by the federal or state
government to secure full compliance with the applicable provisions of state and federallaws. 50 The Welfare and Institutions
Code sets forth the powers and duties of DHHS, which include
the responsibility of the Director of DHHS to formulate, adopt,
amend or repeal regulations and general policies necessary for
the administration of public social services. 51 The California
Rule 52 is part of the regulations promulgated by DHHS and
states that "[t]wo or more AUs in the same home shall be combined into one AU when: [t]here is only one caretaker relative."53 This rule is known as the "non-sibling filing unit" rule
and is based on the economies of scale principle, which asserts
that individuals living with others usually have reduced per
capita costs because many of their expenses are shared. 54 Under the California Rule, when only one caretaker relative
heads a household, all children in the household, sibling and
non-sibling, are combined into one AFDC unit. 55
C. BACKGROUND CASES

1. Promulgation and Application of the Substitute Parent
Regulation
The issue of whether federal law prohibits a state from
grouping all needy children who live under one relative caretaker into a single AFDC AU was first confronted in King v.
Smith. 56 In King, the United States Supreme Court found
that an Alabama regulation57 violated 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)58

50.Id.
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10553(e) (Deering 1994). See also, 51 CAL.
JUR. Public Aid and Welfare § 7 (1979).
52. MPP § 82-824.1.13, see supra note 6.
53. Id. Twenty-nine states have adopted rules that reduce their welfare budgets by considering such households as one. Aaron Epstein, Top court rules states
can cut 'family' welfare; It says all children living together can be counted as one
unit, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 23, 1995, at 12A.
54. Termini, 611 F.2d at 370.
55. John Sanchez, Can a State Reduce Federal Welfare Benefits for Children
Living Together Because "Two Can Live Cheaper than One?", 4 PREVIEW OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 197, Dec. 22, 1994, at 197 [hereinafter
Sanchez]. Siblings are children who have at least one common parent. Non-siblings
have no parent in common. Id.
56. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
57. Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt. I, c. II, § VI.
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because it denied benefits to children who were qualified to
participate in the AFDC program. 59 Under the Alabama regulation, the children were denied AFDC benefits because their
mother cohabited with an able-bodied man even though he had
no obligation under state law to support them. GO In response
to King, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare promulgated the "substitute father" regulation. 61 This regulation
prohibits finding a child ineligible for AFDC on the basis that
a man, other than the child's parent, is living in the home,
without proof that he is actually contributing to the child's
support. 62
The Alabama regulation states in relevant part:
[A]n "able-bodied man, married or single, is considered a
substitute father of all the children of the applicant . . .
mother" in three different situations: (1) if "he lives in
the home with the child's natural or adoptive mother for
the purpose of cohabitation; or (2) if "he visits [the home]
frequently for the purpose of cohabiting with the child's
natural or adoptive mother"; or (3) if "he does not frequent the home but cohabits with the child's natural or
adoptive mother elsewhere."
[d. cited in King, 392 U.S. at 313-14.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1988). This statute states in relevant part: The term
'dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of death, continued absence from the home, . . . , or physicalor mental incapacity of a parent . . .
59. King, 392 U.S. at 309.
60. [d. at 333.
6l. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1994) (predecessor to 45 C.F.R. § 203.1). This statute states in relevant part:
(a) A State plan under title IV-A of the Social Security
Act shall provide that: (1) The determination whether a
child has been deprived of parental support or care by
reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or
physical or mental incapacity of a parent, or . . . will be
made only in relation to the child's natural or adoptive
parent, or in relation to the child's stepparent who is
married, under State law, to the child's natural or adoptive parent and is legally obligated to support the child
under State law of general applicability which requires
stepparents to support stepchildren to the same extent
that natural or adoptive parents are required to support
their children. Under this requirement, the inclusion in
the family, or the presence in the home, of a "substitute
parent" or "man-in-the-house" or any individual other than
one described in this paragraph is not an acceptable basis
for a finding of ineligibility or for assuming the availability of income by the State.
[d.
62. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970), reu'd, Lewis v. Stark, 312 F. Supp.
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The Supreme Court applied the newly promulgated "substitute father" regulation in Lewis v. Martin. 63 In Lewis,
plaintiffs challenged a California law64 which required that
available income of a stepfather or a "male person assuming
the role of spouse" (hereinafter "MARS") be considered in determining the level of need of the AFDC recipient children in
the household. 65 The Court held that "[in] the absence of proof
of actual contribution, California may not consider the child's
'resources' to include either the income of a nonadopting stepfather who is not legally obligated to support the child, as is a
natural parent, or the income of a MARS - whatever the
nature of his obligation to support.,,66 The Court reasoned that
only a person as near as a real or adoptive father would have
the consensual relation to the family to make it certain that
his income would actually be available for support of the children. 67
2. State Statutes Invalidated
In Beaton v. Thompson,68 the Ninth Circuit invalidated a
Washington AFDC regulation69 which grouped together all
197 (D. Cal. 1968).
63. Id.
64. The California law provided that payments to a "needy child" who "lives
with his mother and a stepfather or an adult male person assuming the role of
spouse to the mother although not legally married to her"- known in the vernacular as a MARS - shall be computed after consideration is given to the income of
the stepfather or MARS. Id., at 553-54. On September 3, 1969, the Governor of
California signed into law a new § 11351.5 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, which became effective November 10, 1969. It leaves unchanged §
11351 and implementing regulations insofar as they apply to a stepfather, but
repeals the old § 11351 insofar as it applied to "an adult male person assuming
the role of spouse."Id., at 554 n.2.
65. Id., at 559-60. The California regulations that governed a MARS at the
time these suits were brought were Cal. State Dept. of Social Welfare, Public
Social Services Manual §§ 42-535 (effective Nov. I, 1967), 44-133.5 (effective July
I, 1967). As to a stepfather, the pertinent regulations were Cal. Dept. of Social
Welfare, Public Social Services Manual §§ 42-531 (effective Nov. I, 1967), 44113.242 (effective July I, 1967). Id. n.3.
66. Id., at 599-60. Accord Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975), rev'd,
Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2nd Cir. 1974), remanded, 380 F. Supp. 167
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), vacated and rev'd, 421 U.S. 338 (1975).
67. Lewis, 397 U.S. at 558.
68. 913 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1990).
69. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §388-24-050(3) (1989). The Washington regulation
states in relevant part: "The department shall authorize only one assistance unit
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needy children who lived in the same household under the care
of a single caretaker relative. 70 The plaintiffs in Beaton argued that the act of consolidation required by the regulation
was "an illegal scheme of proration and imputed the income of
a non-legally responsible person.,,71 The State Department of
Social and Health Services argued that its regulation did not
impute income; it only redefined AU as it was empowered to do
by the federal regulations.72 The Ninth Circuit determined the
regulation was invalid, like regulations invalidated in McCoog
u. Hegstrom 73 and Gurley u. Wohlgemuth,74 because its effect
was to presume that the non-legally responsible relative with
whom the child lived was contributing to the support of the
child without proof of any actual contribution. 75
In McCoog u. Hegstrom, the Ninth Circuit invalidated
Oregon's non-needy relative rule 76 which reduced the AFDC
grant for all needy eligible siblings and nonsiblings living with a single caretaker
relative or relative married couple." 1d., cited in Beaton, 913 F.2d at 702.
70. Beaton, 913 F.2d at 70l.
71. 1d. at 702.
72. 1d. at 704.
73. McCoog v. Hegstrom, 690 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1982).
74. Gurley v. Wohlgemuth, 421 F. Supp. 1337 (N.E.D. Pa. 1976).
75. Beaton, 913 F.2d at 704. According to the Ninth Circuit, the regulation
violated 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(viii), which prohibits a reduction in benefits solely
because of the presence in the house of a non-legally responsible adult, and 45
C.F.R. § 233.90(a)(1) and § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D), which mandate against presuming a
non·legally responsible person is contributing to the needy child's expenses. 1d.
These are the same regulations relied upon by respondent in Anderson, Verna
Edwards. Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291, 1296 (1995).
76. OR. ADMIN. R. 461-06-008 (1978). The Oregon rule states in relevant part:
Standards for Dependent Children Living with a NonNeedy Relative in a Place of Residence Maintained as
Their Home:
(1) Definitions:
(a) Non-Needy relative. A person enumerated in ORS
418.035(1)(c), who is ineligible to receive aid to Dependent
Children for his or her needs as a caretaker due to excess income or resources other than any financial need
based program.
(b) Nuclear family. A family group residing together that
consists of the caretaker relative, his or her spouse, and
their children living at home. Not included are other
related or unrelated persons in the household.
(2) The food standard shall be based upon the total number of persons including the nuclear family of the nonneedy relative and the eligible dependent children.
(3) The shelter standard shall consist of the difference be-
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benefits paid to children whose caretaker relatives were not
eligible for welfare assistance. 77 According to the court, in implementing the non-needy relative rule the state assumed that
the caretaker relative would already have been paying for food
and shelter, and that the cost of an additional child in the
household would only be incremental. 78 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that although the Oregon regulation presumed that
the caretaker would bear the majority of the costs of a household, the state did not attempt to determine whether the caretaker, in fact, was meeting his own shelter needs when he
joined with the child to form the AFDC household. 79 The court
also invalidated the No Adult standard,80 which was promulgated after the Department of Human Resources Adult and
Family Services Division had repealed the non-needy relative
rule. 81 The Ninth Circuit found the No Adult Standard to be

tween: a) the shelter standard for the total number of
persons in the nuclear family of the non-needy relative,
including the eligible dependent children, and (b) the total
number of persons in the nuclear family of the non-needy
relative excluding the eligible dependent children.
1d. cited in McCoog, 690 F.2d at 1282 n.3.
77. 1d. at 1282.
78. 1d. at 1282-1283.
79. 1d. at 1285. If the non-legally responsible caretaker is also needy, he or
she can be added to the AFDC grant. 1d. at 1282. If the caretaker is legally responsible for the child, then his or her income and resources are added when
computing the amount of eligibility. 1d.
80. McCoog, 690 F.2d at 1283.
The No Adult standard is substantially identical to the
non-needy relative rule, differing only as follows: First,
the No Adult standard applies to all non-needy relative
cases where an adult is living in the household, including
those excepted from the [non-needy relative rule]. 1d.
Second, the No Adult standard causes no reduction in the
food component of the AFDC grant. 1d. Third, the No
Adult standard does not consider either the number of
persons in the caretaker relative's family who are not
included in the AFDC grant or tax allowances for welfare
recipients in determining the amount of the grant. 1d.
Finally, as was the case in the non-needy relative rule,
under the No Adult standard the children do not receive
a pro rata shelter allowance, but only the much smaller
incremental shelter grant. However, the method of calculating the increment differs slightly between the two
rules.
.
1d.
81. 1d. The plaintiffs filed this action in August 1978, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the then proposed non-needy relative rule. The district
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substantially identical to the non-needy relative rule. 82
In Gurley v. Wohlgemuth, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania invalidated a Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare Manual regulation83
(hereinafter "DPW") as violative of the "substitute father" federal regulation. 84 Pursuant to the DPW Manual regulation,
the plaintiffs in this action (two sisters, one with a minor
daughter and the other with two minor daughters) were treated as a single AU of five persons for purposes of determining
the amount of their monthly AFDC grant because they lived
together. 85 The District Court maintained, however, that the
federal regulations require proof of actual contribution to the
welfare of the child, and that the fact that two AFDC families
decided to live together did not affect the rights of the children
under the regulation. 86
The State argued that the DPW Manual regulation did not
violate federal regulations because it did not assume the avail-

court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendants from enforcing
the rule, but denied a permanent injunction and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit declined to
reach the merits of the plaintiff's claims, and remanded the case to the district
court to develop a more complete factual record. On remand, the plaintiffs filed a
supplemental amended complaint challenging both the non-needy relative rule and
the new No Adult Standard. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring both the non-needy relative rule and the No Adult Standard to be invalid because they conflict with the Social Security Act and federal
regulations. Defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at
1284.
82. Id. at 1283.
83. Pa. Dept. of Public Welfare Manual § 3243. This regulation states in relevant part:
"An 'assistance unit' is any group of persons who occupy
a common dwelling unit and who are applying for or
receiving ADC or GA. (A roomer, or a roomer and boarder, and their dependents with whom they are living are a
separate unit.) There is only one assistance unit in a
dwelling unit.
Id. cited in Gurley, 421 F. Supp. at 1339 n.2.
ADC refers to the AFDC program, while GA refers to "General Assistance," a
state welfare program. Gurley v. Wohlgemuth, 421 F. Supp. 1337, 1339 n.2
(N.E.D. Pa. 1976).
84. Id. at 1337. See supra, note 6l.
85. Gurley, 421 F. Supp. at 1338.
86. Id. at 1346.
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ability of income at all, but rather took into account the
amount of money required to satisfy the needs of a child living
in a household occupied by a larger number of people. 87 According to the state, children living with a larger number of
people require a smaller amount of money than children living
in a smaller group, due to the economies of scale principle. 88
The District Court rejected this argument, holding that the
economies of scale principle had a fundamental fallacy in that
it was based upon a conclusive presumption that one AFDC
family contributed to the support of another AFDC family.89
The DPW Manual regulation assumed that resources were
pooled, taking advantage of economies of scale, without an
actual determination that resources were in fact being
pooled. 90
3. State Statutes Upheld
In a number of recent decisions,9! federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort have issued rulings at odds
with the decisions in Beaton v. Thompson, McCoog v. Hegstrom
and Gurley v. Wohlgemuth. 92
In Bray v. Dowling,93 the plaintiffs sought to invalidate a
New York administrative pOlicy94 on the basis that it violated
two federal regulations 95 which prohibit states from assuming
that a non-legally responsible individual living in a home with
an AFDC unit will contribute income to that AFDC unit. 96
87. [d.
88. [d.
89. [d. at 1347.

90. Gurley, 421 F. Supp. at 1347.
91. Bray v. Dowling, 25 F.3d 135 (2nd Cir. 1994); Wilkes v. Gomez, 32 F.3d
1324 (8th Cir. 1994); Morrell v. Flaherty, 449 S.E.2d 175 (N.C. 1994); Macinnes v.
Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 593 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1992).
92. Beaton v. Thompson, 913 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1990); McCoog v. Hegstrom,
690 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1982); Gurley v. Wohlgemuth, 421 F. Supp. 1337 (N.E.D.
Pa. 1976).
93. 25 F.3d at 135.
94. Title 18 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the
State of New York, §§ 369(a)(1)(ii)(a), 369(a)(3)(i) (1993). See infra, note 108, for
relevant text of these regulations.
95. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(viii) and 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a)(1) (1993). See infra
notes 196 and 198 for relevant text of these regulations.
96. Bray, 25 F.3d at 138.
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Penny Bray lived with her three minor children and received
AFDC assistance as a four-person family unit. 97 Ms. Bray
then took custody of two minor dependent nieces and applied
to the Monroe County Department of Social Services (hereinafter "Agency") to have the nieces added to her existing AFDC
public assistance grant.98 She was thereafter provided with a
six-person public assistance grant. 99 Ms. Bray subsequently
requested and received a hearing from the New York State
Department of Social Services (hereinafter "NYSDSS") to challenge the Agency's failure to provide a separate two-person
assistance grant for her nieces. loo The NYSDSS concluded
that the Agency had acted appropriately in treating Bray's
nieces as part of the same AU.lO l Curtistine Robinson, the
other plaintiff in the Bray case, initially received public assistance only for herself. 102 She then received custody of her
niece and was provided with a two-person AFDC assistance
grant. l03 She also requested and received a hearing to review
the adequacy of her grant. 104 The NYSDSS determined that
Robinson was not eligible to receive a separate grant of assistance. 105
Plaintiffs also argued that the New York policy violated
two federal regulations l06 requiring equitable, uniform, and
reasonable treatment of AFDC recipients. 107 The New York
administrative policy provided that all children living with an
adult caretaker relative are considered part of one AU, even if
the household contains children for whom the caretaker is not
legally responsible under state law. 108

97. Id. at 137.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Bray, 25 F.3d at 137.
101. Id. at 138.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Bray, 25 F.3d at 138.
105. Id.
106. 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.10(a)(1), 233.20(a)(2)(iii) (1994).
107. Bray, 25 F.3d at 138.
108. Title 18, sections 369.2(a)(1)(ii)(a) and 369.3(a)(3)(i) (1993) of the Official
Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York.
Section 369(a)(1)(ii)(a) states in relevant part:
When [a] child is living with an eligible relative other
than a parent, who is without adequate means of support,
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The Second Circuit held that the New York regulation was
valid under the federal regulations. l09 The court declined to
follow the holding in Beaton on the grounds that Beaton did
not recognize or discuss the distinction between a single caretaker who is obligated to expend AFDC funds for the benefit of
all the minor children in her household, and a non-legally
responsible individual who has no corresponding obligation,
such as a boyfriend. no The Second Circuit explained that the
purpose of the federal regulations was to prevent AFDC applicants from excluding certain family members who must be
considered part of the AU, 111 and not to exclude extended
family who reside together in a single AFDC AU. 112 The court
held that it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress, in
enacting these regulations as part of an act designed to reduce
budget outlays, would prohibit states from employing the costsaving measure of including members of an extended family
who reside together in a single AFDC AU. 113
The plaintiffs in Bray also claimed that the New York
regulation violated federal laws requiring uniform treatment of
AFDC recipients. ll4 New York argued that its regulation pro-

financial need shall be determined for the family unit in
accordance with public assistance standards.
[d., cited in Bray, 25 F.3d at 137 n.3.
Section 369.3(a)(3)(i) states in relevant part:
If children of different parentage are living with the same
eligible relative, a single grant shall be issued to meet
the needs of all children in the household receiving
[AFDC].
[d., cited in Bray, 25 F.3d at 137 n.3.
109. Bray, 25 F.3d at 135.
110. [d. at 145. In addition, the Second Circuit found that the Department of
Health and Human Services, as its predecessor the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, has consistently taken the position that states have the option
to treat a relative caretaker and minor children in her household for whom she is
not legally responsible as a single AFDC assistance unit. [d. at 142.
111. AFDC applicants were not including family members who had an income
when they applied for AFDC because if they did their allowance would be reduced
accordingly. [d. at 142
112. [d.
113. [d.
114. Bray, 215 F.3d at 146. The two federal regulations are 45 C.F.R. §
233.lO(a)(1) (1993) and 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(iii) (1993). See infra note 229 for
relevant text of 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1) (1993). 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(iii) (1993)
states in relevant part: "A State Plan for . . . AFDC . . . must . . . provide that
the standard will be uniformly applied throughout the State ... " [d., cited in
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vided uniformity because it bestowed identical treatment to
similarly sized households with one caretaker, receiving AFDC
assistance. 115 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, advocated
uniformity that insured a dependent child would receive the
same AFDC benefit whether he was taken into a household
that already constituted an AFDC AU or whether he was taken into a non-AFDC household. 116 The Second Circuit held
that the New York regulation did provide uniform treatment
among AFDC recipients,117 and it was not persuaded that
plaintiffs' scheme for the equitable treatment of recipients
should be substituted for the defendant's. 118
In Wilkes v. Gomez,119 the Eighth Circuit held that
Minnesota's AU rule,120 which consolidates non-sibling AFDC
recipient children who reside with a single adult caretaker into
a single AU, did not violate the "availability principle" embodied in three federal AFDC regulations. 121 The availability
principle limits a state's power to lower an AFDC recipient's
benefits by imputing support from persons who have no obliga-

Bray 25 F.3d at 139 n.6.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Wilkes, 32 F.3d at 1324.
120. MINN. RULE 9500.2440 , subp. 2 and subp. 3. Minnesota's AFDC plan has
a two-step process to determine the size of an assistance unit:
MINN. RULE 9500.2440, subp. 2 states in relevant part:
When an application for assistance is made for a dependent child, that child and all blood related and adoptive
minor siblings of that child, including half-siblings, along
with the parents of that child who live together, must be
considered a single filing unit.
Id. cited in Wilkes, 32 F.3d at 1327 n.3.
MINN. RULE 9500.2440, subpart 3 states in relevant part:
Eligible members of a filing unit who are required by
federal law to apply for AFDC must be included in a
single assistance unit. Members of separate filing units
who live together must be included in a single assistance
unit when: (A) one caretaker makes application for separate filing units; and (B) two caretakers, who are currently married to each other, make application for separate
filing units.
Id. cited in Wilkes, 32 F.3d at 1327.
121. 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1993), 233.20(a)(2)(viii) (1993), and
233.90(a)(1) (1993). See infra note 175 for the relevant text of these regulations.
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tion to furnish it. 122 The Eighth Circuit also held that
Minnesota's AU rule did not violate federal regulations that
mandate uniform treatment among AFDC recipients. 123
AFDC recipients urged the Eighth Circuit to follow Beaton
and declare the Minnesota rule to be in violation of the availability principle because it assumed that nonlegally obligated
individuals would share expenses, but the court declined to do
SO.124 The court based its decision on the fact that "Beaton did
not recognize or discuss the distinction between a single caretaker who is obligated to expend AFDC funds for the benefit of
all the minor children in her household and a non-legally responsible individual who has no corresponding obligation. "125
The Wilkeses also argued that the Minnesota regulation
unfairly preferred dependent children who lived in a nonAFDC household by giving them a higher per capita allowance,
as opposed to children who lived in a household that already
receives AFDC. 126 The Eighth Circuit determined that the
uniformity sought by the plaintiffs required treatment for
children taken into a household with other AFDC recipients to
be equal with the treatment given to children taken into a nonAFDC household. 127 Minnesota chose instead to provide uniform AFDC benefits to similarly sized households with one
caretaker relative. 128 According to the court, the two forms of
uniformity were mutually exclusive, and the court was not
persuaded that the federal regulations required Minnesota to
choose one over the other. 129
In MacInnes v. Commissioner of Public Welfare,13o the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts also declined to follow

122. Wilkes. at 1328.
123. [d. at 1326. 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1) and 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1) (1993).
See infra note 229 for relevant text of these regulations.
124. [d. at 1330.
125. [d. (citing Bray, 25 F.3d at 145).
126. Wilkes, 32 F.3d at 1330.
127. [d.
128. [d.
129. [d. (citing Bray, 25 F.3d at 146 and Action Transmittal No. ACF-AT-94-6
at 6 (Mar. 16, 1994)).
130. 593 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1992).
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Beaton. 131 The court affirmed a grant of partial summary
judgment for the State, declaring that the statute 132 and regulation 133 authorizing the combining of non-siblings into one
AU did not violate federal law. 134 Massachusetts' statute required the Department of Public Welfare to add non-sibling
children who receive AFDC and reside with the same caretaker
relative, into one AU, thereby prohibiting such children from
receiving an independent AFDC grant. 135
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts recognized that
there are some federal requirements for the composition of
AUs, but held that "[o]utside of ... [the Federal policy], it is
up to the State to establish policy on the number of AUs in the
household, e.g., when an individual not related to a member of
an AU as a parent, brother or sister lives in the household and
files for assistance."136 The court also concluded that because
131. Id. at 226.
132. Section 58 of Statute 1990, c. 150. The Massachusetts statute states in
relevant part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or special
law to the contrary, the department of public welfare is
hereby authorized and directed to revise its rules and
regulations pursuant to law with respect to the optional
assistance program that in the event an additional child
is added to the household of the recipient, such additional
child shall not be considered as a new case but treated
only as an additional child as otherwise eligible for assistance under the provisions of chapter eighteen of the
General Laws. Said department may waive the provisions
of this section if the department determines that application of this section would cause a particular child to become homeless or to endure other undue hardship.
Id., cited in MacInnes, 593 N.E.2d at 224 n.2.
133. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 304.305(B) (1990). The Massachusetts regulation states in relevant part:
Whenever an application is made on behalf of a dependent child by a grantee-relative who is not the natural or
adoptive parent, except for the dependent child in 106
CMR 304.305(c), this dependent child must be in the
same assistance unit as the dependent child in 106 CMR
304.305(A) unless to do so would cause a particular child
to become homeless or to endure undue hardship. In this
instance the Department may waive this provision.
Id., cited in MacInnes, 593 N.E.2d at 224 n.2.
134. MacInnes, 593 N.E.2d at 227.
135. See supra notes 132 and 133.
136. MacInnes, 593 N.E.2d at 225 (citing Action Transmittal No. SSA-AT-86-1 of
the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Jan. 13, 1986).
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42 U.S.C. § 605 137 imposes on the caretaker an obligation to

use all of the AFDC grant for the benefit of everyone in the
AU,138 no assumption was being made about the availability
of income to an AFDC recipient from a relative who has no
legal obligation to support the AFDC recipient. 139 The
caretaker's obligation was found to be sufficient to satisfy the
requirement that the amount of assistance to a dependent
child should not include income or resources assumed to be
available to him or her which are not actually available under
the law. 140
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY - ANDERSON v.
EDWARDS
A.

FACTS

Verna Edwards initially received AFDC assistance only on
behalf of her granddaughter. 141 Mrs. Edwards later began
caring for her two grandnieces, who were siblings. 142 Pursuant to the federal family filing unit rule,143 the grandnieces
were grouped together in a two-person AU and the granddaughter as a single-person AU. l44 Mrs. Edwards herself did
not receive any AFDC assistance. 145 In June 1991, Mrs. Edwards received notice that pursuant to California's non-sibling
filing unit rule,146 her granddaughter and two grandnieces

137. 42 U.S.C.A. § 605 (West 1991).
138. MacInnes, 593 N.E.2d at 225.
139. MacInnes, 593 N.E.2d at 225.
140. Id. The plaintiffs in MacInnes also brought a preemption claim and an a
claim for uniform treatment among AFDC recipients similar to those brought by
Mrs. Edwards, in addition to an Equal Protection claim. The judge rejected all of
these claims. Id. at 225-27.
141. Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291, 1295 (1995).
142. Id.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
144. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1295.
145. Id. The family unit rule, 45 C.F.R. 206.1O(a)(1)(vii) (1994) & 45 C.F.R.
206.10(b)(5) (1994), requires parents to apply for assistance along with their children. See also, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (1988 ed. Supp. V). The family unit rule
does not require that Mrs. Edwards be a member of the assistance unit because
she is not their natural or adoptive parent.
146. Cal. Dept. of Social Servs., Manual of Policies & Procedures § 82-824.1.13.
[hereinafter MPP § 82-824.1.13]. The California regulation states in relevant part:
"[T]wo or more AUs in the same home shall be combined into one AU when: . . .
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would be grouped together into a single three-person AU. 147
Between July 1, 1989, and August 31, 1991, California
adhered to the following schedule of maximum monthly AFDC
payments:

Number of
persons in AU
1
$
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 or more

Maximum
payment
341
$
560
694
824
940
1,057
1,160
1,265
1,366
1,468

Per capita
payment
341.00
280.00
231.33
206.00
188.00
176.17
165.71
158.13
151.78
146.80 148

[T]here is only one caretaker relative." [d.
147. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1295.
148. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1295. The current payment schedule is as follows:
Number of eligible needy
Maximum aid
persons in the same home
$
326
1
~5
2
3
663

4

~8

5
899
6
l~ro
7
1,109
8
1,209
9
1,306
10 or more
1,403
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE ANN. § 11450 (Deering 1994). Section 11450 is supplemented by §§ 11450.01(a), (b), (c) (Deering 1994) and 11450.015(a),(b) (Deering
1994) as follows:
§ 11450.01(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
commencing October 1, 1992, the maximum aid payments
specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section
11450 in effect on July 1, 1992, shall be reduced by 4.5
percent.
(b)(1) The department shall seek the approval from the
United States Department of Health and Human Services
that is necessary to reduce the maximum aid payments
specified in subdivision (a) by an additional amount equal
to 1.3 percent of the maximum aid payments specified in
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In Mrs. Edwards' case, the granddaughter, as a singleperson AU, was eligible to receive a "maximum aid payment"
of $341 per month prior to September 1991. 149 The
grandnieces' two-person AU was eligible to receive $560 per
month prior to September 1991. 150 In total Mrs. Edwards received $901 per month in AFDC assistance on behalf of the
three girls. 151 After the California Rule 152 was applied (converting the two units into one), Mrs. Edwards was eligible to
receive only $694 per month as indicated by the preceding table. 153 Thus, by applying the California Rule Mrs. Edwards
AFDC payment was reduced by $207 per month. 154

paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 11450 in effect
on July 1, 1992.
(b)(2) The reduction provided by this subdivision shall be
made on the first day of the month following 30 days
after the date of approval by the United States Department of Health and Human Services.
(c) This section shall remain operative only until July 1,
1996, shall remaining effect only until January 1, 1997,
and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, which is enacted before January 1, 1997, deletes
or extends that date.
[d.

§ 11450.015(a) Notwithstanding any other provlSlon of
law, the maximum aid payments in effect on June 30,
1993, in accordance with paragraph (1) of subdivision (a)
of Section 11450 as reduced by subdivisions (a) and (b) of
Section 11450.01, shall be reduced by 2.7 percent begin. ning the first of the month following 60 days after the
enactment of this section.
(b) Commencing July 1, 1996, the maximum aid payment
levels in effect on June 30, 199, shall be increased by the
total dollar amount of the decrease made in each payment
level during the 1992-93 fiscal year pursuant to Section
11450.01.
[d.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1295.
[d.
[d.
MPP § 82-824.1.13, supra note 146.
[d.
[d.
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B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mrs. Edwards, and others similarly situated brought a
class action in the District Court for the Eastern District of
California. 155 Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the California Rule violated federal law, and an injunction prohibiting
defendants from enforcing it.156 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court, in an unpublished decision,157 ruled in favor of Mrs. Edwards. 15s The District
Court relied on Beaton,159 which invalidated a Washington
AFDC rule similar to the California Rule. 160 In Beaton, the
Ninth Circuit held that Washington's rule was invalid because
it assumed that the caretaker of AFDC children allocated at
least a portion of his or her income to the children, even
though the caretaker was not legally responsible for them. 161
The Acting Director of the California Department of Social
Services 162 appealed to the United States Court· of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. In a brief opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 163 It found the California Rule "virtually identical" to
the Washington regulation that Beaton had held to be "incon-

155. The class action suit included all AFDC households with siblings and nonsibling children who are consolidated into a single unit for purposes of calculating
AFDC benefits. This action was brought by Verna Edwards, for herself and as
guardian ad litem for Vernais Edwards, Pamela Edwards, and Ericka Edwards;
Barbara Moore, for herself and as guardian ad litem for Rebiana Robi, Derral
Robi, Delisha Jaa, and Rayleisha Taylor; and Vanessa Hamilton, for herself and as
guardian ad litem for Johnny Watson, Cleo Thomas, Ricky MacDonald, Jimmy
Pashell, and Stanley Hamilton. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at I, Anderson
(No. 93-1883).
156. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1295. Just prior to this case was filed in the district court, MPP § 44-205 was in effect. On October I, 1991, California repealed §
44-205 and adopted § 82-824. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, at 5 n.2, Anderson
(No. 93-1883).
157. D.C. No. CV-91-01473-DFL
158. Sanchez, supra note 55, at 197 [hereinafter Sanchez]' Siblings are children
who have at least one common parent. Non-siblings have no parent in common.
[d.
159. Beaton v. Thompson, 913 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1990).
160. [d.
161. Sanchez, supra note 158, at 198.
162. The Acting Director of the Department of Social Services who appealed
was John Healy. Edwards v. Healy, 12 F.3d 154 (9th Cir. 1993).
163. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1295.
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sistent with federal law and regulation."I64 Before a threejudge panel, California argued, unsuccessfully, that Beaton was
erroneously decided and should be overruled. 16s However, the
court stated that even if it did agree with California's argument, the court had no authority to overrule or disregard
Beaton. 166 Beaton could only be overruled through an en bane
decision. 167
California requested a rehearing before a three-judge panel and also requested that its case be heard en banc. 16s Neither request was granted. 169 The Director of California Department of Social Services then filed a petition for certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
granted the petition for certiorari because a number of federal
appellate courts and state courts of last resort had issued rulings at odds with the decision below. 170 In granting certiorari,
the Court also considered the fact that the Department of
Health and Human Services, which administers the AFDC
program on the federal level, issued an Action Transmittal
stating that its own AFDC regulations "do not conflict with the
State policy option to consolidate AUs in the same household."171 The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
Ninth Circuit's decision. 172
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
Respondents, Verna Edwards and her three relatives,
brought this action against the state officials charged with
administering California's AFDC program, claiming that
California's non-sibling filing unit rule 173 violated federal

164. [d. (citing Edwards, 12 F.3d at 155).
165. Edwards, 12 F.3d at 155.
166. [d.
167. [d.
168. Sanchez, supra note 158, at 198.
169. [d.
170. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1296. Edwards v. Healy, 12 F.3d 154 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. granted sub nom. Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 41 (1994), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 1291 (1995).
171. [d. at 1295.
172. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1291.
173. Cal. Dept. of Social Servs., Manual of Policies & Procedures § 82-824.1.13.
[hereinafter MPP § 82-824.1.13]. [d.
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law. 174 In bringing this action, respondents relied primarily
on three federal regulations in making their claim, 45 C.F.R.
§§ 233.20(a)(2)(viii), 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) and 233.90(a)(1).175
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis of the
pertinent federal regulations by indicating "the starting point
of the ... analysis must be a recognition that ... federal law
gives each state great latitude in dispensing its available
funds.,,176 In King v. Smith,177 the Court held that states
have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources,
since each state is free to set its own standard of need l78 and
to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it
devotes to the program. 179

174. Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291, 1292 (1995).
175. [d. at 1293-94.
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1994). This regulation states in relevant part:
[I]n detennining need and the amount of the assistance
payment . . . a State shall consider income . . . and resources available for current use. It further indicates that
income and resources are considered available both when
actually available and when the applicant or recipient . . .
has the legal ability to make such sum available for support and maintenance.
[d.
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(viii) (1994). This statute states in relevant part:
[Tlhe [statel agency will not assume any contribution
from . . . [a non-legally responsible individual] for the
support of the assistance unit . . .
[d.
45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a)(1) (1994). This statute states in relevant part:
[Tlhe inclusion in the family, or the presence in the
home, of a "substitute parent" or "man-in-the-house" or
any individual other than [the child's parent, adoptive
parent, or stepparent who is married to child's natural
parentl is not an acceptable basis for a finding of ineligibility or for assuming the availability of income by the
State.
[d.
176. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1296 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
478 (1970), rev'd, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968), reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 914
(1970); and Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974), affd, 475 F.2d 731 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. James v. Cohen, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985».
177. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
178. HEW, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, in pt. IV § 3120.
179. King, 392 U.S. at 318-319.
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A. EFFECT OF THE ARRIVAL OF MRS. EDWARDS' GRANDNIECES
TO HER HOUSEHOLD

According to Mrs. Edwards, the reduction in her
granddaughter's per capita benefit occurred solely because of
the presence of the grandnieces in her household. lso Since the
grandnieces are non-legally responsible individuals in relation
to the granddaughter, Mrs. Edwards argued that the assumption that the grandnieces would contribute income to the
granddaughter, or vice-versa, violated federal law. 1Sl Such
federal law prohibits a state from assuming that a non-legally
responsible individual will contribute income to an AFDC unit
solely because she lives with them. 182
Mrs. Edwards explained that her granddaughter's AFDC
benefit was reduced from $341 to one-third of $694, or
$231.33,183 per month, after the grandnieces moved in. 1M
This reduction, she argued, occurred solely because of the presence of the grandnieces in the household who were non-legally
responsible individuals in relation to the granddaughter. 185
Mrs. Edwards noted that since her granddaughter and her two
grandnieces owed no legal duty of support to each other, they
could not be made to contribute anything for the other's
care. 18S
The Supreme Court maintained that it was not solely the
presence of the grandnieces that triggered the reduction in the
per capita benefits paid to the granddaughter,187 rather the
reduction was caused by the grandnieces' presence in the
household plus their application for AFDC assistance through

180. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1296.
181. 45 C.F.R. §233.20(a)(2)(viii) (1994).
182. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1296.
183. See infra Section III A - Facts for table.
184. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1296 (citing Brief for Respondents at 6, 22).
185. Id.
186. See Sanchez, supra note 161 at 197.
187. Id. It is important to note that it is not the granddaughter who received
the AFDC assistance payment, but Mrs. Edwards, as the caretaker, on her behalf.
In addition, Mrs. Edwards is under a duty to use the payment in the best interest
of the children for whom she cares. See 42 U.S.C. § 605 (1988); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE ANN. § 11005.5 (West 1991), § 11480 (West 1994).
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Mrs. Edwards. 188 The Court explained that had the
grandnieces applied through a different caretaker relative
living in the household, the California Rule 189 would not have
affected the benefits received by the two AUs. 190 The Court
based its analysis on the economies of scale principle, indicating that individuals living with others usually have reduced
per capita costs because many of their expenses are
shared. 191
B. No VIOLATION OF THE AVAILABILITY PRINCIPLE

Respondents also claimed that the California Rule violated
the availability principle, which prohibits a state from assuming that income from relatives is contributed to, or is otherwise
available to, a needy child without a determination that such
income actually is available. 192
The availability principle is implemented by three federal
regulations. 193 The first regulation is 45 C.F .R. §
233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D),194 which precludes the state from counting
as available to an AU resources that are not actually or legally
available to one of its members. 195 The second regulation is
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(viii),196 which provides that states
cannot reduce payments based on the presence of a non-legally

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
part:

Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1296.
MPP § 82-824.1.13.
Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1296.
[d. at n.5.
[d. at 1297.
[d.
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1994). This regulation states in relevant
[I]n detennining need and the amount of the assistance
payment . . . a State shall consider income . . . and resources available for current use. It further indicates that
income and resources are considered available both when
actually available and when the applicant or recipient . . .
has the legal ability to make such sum available for support and maintenance.

[d.
195. Wilkes v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1324, 1329 (8th Cir. 1994).
196. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(viii) (1994). This statute states in relevant part:
[T]he [state] agency will not assume any contribution from . . . [a non-legally
responsible individual] for the support of the assistance unit . . .
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responsible individual in the household, and the agency will
not assume any contribution from such individual for the support of the AU. 197 The final regulation is 45 C.F.R. §
233.90(a)(1),198 which prohibits the states from finding an
otherwise needy child ineligible for AFDC on the assumption
that the income of a "substitute parent" or "man-in-the-house"
is available to support the child, and arriving at the like conclusion that the child is not deprived of parental support. 199
Respondents claimed that the California Rule violated all three
federal regulations because it assumed that income from a
non-legally responsible relative contributed to the support of
an AFDC child without requiring a factual determination that
income was actually available. 20o Respondents provided the
Court with the following example to illustrate their argument:
If Mrs. Edwards' granddaughter were [sic] to
begin receiving $75 per month in outside income, ... the AU of which she is a part would
receive $75 less in monthly AFDC benefits, and
the two grandnieces would each accordingly
receive $25 less in per capita monthly benefits.
Thus the California Rule ... "assumes," in violation of all three federal regulations, that the
granddaughter will contribute $25 per month of
her outside income to each grandniece and also
that such income will therefore be available to
each grandniece - without a case-specific determination that such contribution will in fact
occur. 201

The Supreme Court identified two reasons why the

197. Wilkes, 32 F.3d at 1329-30.
198. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a)(1) (1994). This statute states in relevant part:
[T]he inclusion in the family, or the presence in the
horne, of a "substitute parent" or "man-in-the-house" or
any individual other than [the child's parent, adoptive
parent, or stepparent who is married to child's natural
parent] is not an acceptable basis for a finding of ineligibility or for assuming the availability of income by the
State.
[d.

199. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 35, Anderson (No. 93-1883).
200. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1297.
201. [d.
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respondents' argument failed. 202 First, the Court questioned
the premise of the argument because respondents assumed
that Mrs. Edwards would expend an equal amount of AFDC
assistance on each of the three children without taking into
consideration whether one of them receives outside income. 203
This assumption, the Court stated, "fails to reflect reality"204
in that custodial parents routinely use the funds for the support of the entire family.205 Furthermore, the Court found the
assumption to be inconsistent with the duty imposed on caretakers by federal law. 206 According to state and federal regulations, a caretaker is under a duty to spend the AFDC allowance in the best interest of the children for whom she or he
cares. 207 The Court concluded that California may rationally
assume that a caretaker will observe her duties and take into
account any outside income received by one child, when spending the funds on behalf of the whole AU. 208
The Supreme Court also indicated that respondents
misperceived the operation of the California Rule. 209 The
monthly payment was reduced because the two grandnieces
were placed in the same AU as the granddaughter, not because
California assumes that outside income was available to the
grandnieces. 210 The Court found that respondents were really
attacking the rule 211 which states that the income of all mem-

202. [d.
203. [d.
204. [d.
205. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600 n.14 (1987). "Congress' finding that
custodial parents were routinely using the support funds for the entire family thus
reflects the reality that such use is typically proper since expenditures for an
entire family unit typically benefit each member of the household." [d.
206. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1297. See 42 U.S.C. § 605 (1988); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE ANN. § 11005.5 (West 1991), § 11480 (West 1994).
207. [d. The Court explained that under the example provided by the respondents, Mrs. Edwards' two grandnieces will receive $25.00 less only if one assumes
that Mrs. Edwards will spend an equal amount of the AFDC assistance on each of
the three children. This action, as a result, would violate the caretaker's duty
because Mrs. Edwards would not be taking into consideration the fact that her
granddaughter is receiving $75.00 from outside income. See supra note 201. Ander·
son, 115 S. Ct. at 1297.
208. [d.
209. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1297.
210. [d.
211. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(b)(5) (1994). The full text of the statute reads: Assis·
tance Unit is the group of individuals whose income, resources and needs are
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bers in the AU must be combined in order to determine the
amount of the assistance payment to the AU. 212 As a result,
the California Rule was found to be consistent with the AFDC
statute itself, which provides that a state agency "shall, in
determining need, take into consideration any . . . income and
resources of any child or relative claiming [AFDC assistance].,,213 The Court also held that because states have
"great latitude"214 and "broad discretion,,215 in administering
their AFDC programs, California can reasonably construe the
federal regulations to allow consideration of the income and
resources of all the AU members. 216
The Court then noted, agreeing with the petitioners, that
the availability principle addresses a different problem than
the one respondents presented. 217 The purpose of the regulations is to prevent a state from including income and resources
controlled by persons who are not members of the AU, when
determining the amount of assistance to be provided to the
AU. 21s The Court stated that the availability regulations were
adopted to implement the Supreme Court's decisions in three
AFDC cases. 219 In all three cases, the Court found that the
state had counted as available to the AU income that was not
actually or legally available because it was controlled by persons who were not members of the AU. 220 In determining the

considered as a unit for purposes of determining eligibility and the amount of
payment. [d. See also, 42 U.s.C.A. § 602(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1995). This statute
states in relevant part:
[A State agency] shall, in determining need, take into
consideration any other income and resources of any child
or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children, or of any other individual (living in the same home
as such child and relative) whose needs the State determines should be considered in determining the need of
the child or relative claiming such aid.
[d.

212. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1297.
213. [d. at 1298. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
214. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970). See supra notes 176-179.
215. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974). See supra notes 176-179.
216. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1298.
217. [d.
218. [d.
219. [d. See Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975); Lewis v. Martin, 397
U.S. 552 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
220. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1298. King involved a state statute that denied
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amount of assistance given to Mrs. Edwards' granddaughter
and grandnieces, California did not take into consideration the
income of Mrs. Edwards or of anyone else who was not a member of the AU. 221 In sum, the Court held that the California
Rule does not violate any of the three federal regulations on
which the Ninth Circuit relied. 222
C. RESPONDENTS' ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS

Respondents had two alternative arguments. 223 First, respondents maintained that the California Rule was an invalid
expansion of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38), the family filing unit
rule. 224 According to respondents, when Congress decreed
that all members of a nuclear family must be grouped together
into a single AU, it intended to prevent states from including
any additional persons in that AU (as does the California
Rule).225 The Court rejected respondents' contention that
Congress pre-empted states from adopting any additional rules
expanding the family filing unit rule. 226 The Court stated
that "[iJf Congress had intended to pre-empt state plans and
efforts in such an important dimension of the AFDC program ... , such intentions would in all likelihood had been
expressed in direct and unambiguous language.,,227
Respondent's other argument was that the California Rule
did not provide uniform treatment among AFDC recipients,
and thereby violated federal law. 228 Respondents pointed to
children AFDC benefits if their mother cohabited with an able-bodied man even
though he had not obligation under state law to support them. King, 392 U.S. at
309. Lewis involved a California statute that required that available income of a
stepfather, or a male person assuming the role of spouse, be considered in determining the level of AFDC assistance. Lewis, 397 U.S. at 552. Van Lare involved a
New York lodger regulation which required a pro-rata reduction in the AFDC
allowance a family received, solely because a parent allows a nonlegally responsible person to reside in the home. Van Lare, 421 U.S. at 338.
221. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1298.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1299.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1299.
227. Id. (citing New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 414 (1973».
228. Id.
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two federal regulations 229 which require equitable treatment
among AFDC recipients. 23o One regulation states that the
groups selected for inclusion in the plan and the eligibility
conditions imposed must not exclude individuals or groups on
an arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result in
inequitable treatment of individuals. 231 The other regulation
provides that the determination of need and the amount of
assistance for all applicants and recipients will be made on an
objective and equitable basis. 232
The Supreme Court briefly stated that "[a]ssuming [the
asserted federal regulations] provisions even create a 'federal
right' that is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [a federal civil
rights action statute],233 ... we find that the California Rule
affirmatively fosters equitable treatment among AFDC recipients."234 The Court found that the California Rule fosters eq229. 45 C.1.'.R. § 233.10(a)(I) (1994), 233.20(a)(I)(i) (1994).
Section 233.10(a)(I) (1994) states in relevant part:
A State plan must: (1) . . . The groups selected for inclusion in the plan and the eligibility conditions imposed
must not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or
unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable
treatment of individuals or groups.
[d.
Section 233.20(a)( 1)(i) (1994) states in relevant part:
A State plan must: (1)(i) Provide that the determination
of need and amount of assistance for all applicants and
recipients will be made on an objective and equitable
basis.
[d.

230.
231.
232.
233.
lows:

Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1299.
45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1) (1994).
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1)(i) (1994).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994). The full text of the statute reads as folCivil Action for Deprivation of Rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

[d.

234. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1299. The plaintiffs in Wilkes, 32 F.3d at 1324
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uitable treatment because it provides for equally sized and
equally needy households to receive the same amount of AFDC
assistance. 235 For example, before the California Rule was in
effect, a three sister AU would receive $694 per month. 236 At
the same time, Mrs. Edwards was receiving $901 for the three
girlS.237 The $207 difference was due to the fact that in one
household all of the children are siblings, while in Mrs.
Edwards' household they were not. 238 The Court concluded
that the California Rule sensibly and equitably eliminates
these disparities by providing that equally seized and equally
needy households will receive equal AFDC assistance. 239
Thus, the California Rule does not violate the equitable treatment regulations. 24o
The Supreme Court concluded that the California Rule
does not violate federal law and reversed the Ninth Circuit.241 The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. 242
V. CRITIQUE
Based on conflicting decisions from several federal courts
and state courts of last resort, the Supreme Court's intervention in Anderson 243 was necessary to assure uniform application of the federal regulations governing the administration of
the AFDC program. 244 As found by the United States Supreme Court, the California rule does not violate the "availabiland in Bray, 25 F.3d at 135 argued that inequitable treatment results because
children who are placed in a non-AFDC household will received more assistance
than those children who are placed in a household already receiving AFDC. Id.
The Eighth and Second Circuit were not persuaded by this argument. The courts
stated that both forms of equity are mutually exclusive and they were not per.
suaded to choose one over the other. Id.
235. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1299.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1299.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1300.
242. Id.
243. Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291 (1995).
244. Id. at 1295-96. See also, Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4-5, Anderson
(No. 93-1883).
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ity principle" found in those federal regulations or any other
federal regulations which regulate the states' administration of
their AFDC programs. 245
The California Rule groups into a single AFDC AU all
needy children who live in the same household under the care
of one relative. Although needy children will receive less in per
capita benefits under the California Rule, this reduction affects
only children who share a household. 246 California is simply
recognizing the economies of scale that inhere in such living
arrangements.,,247 Shared expenses serve to reduce the overall costs of a household, thus allowing for a reduction in benefits. Further, such grouping allows states to grant equal assistance to equally sized needy households, regardless of whether
the children in the household are all siblings. 248
VI. CONCLUSION
The case of Anderson v. Edwards asked the Supreme
Court to decide the constitutionality of California's non-sibling
filing unit rule. The California Rule groups all sibling and nonsibling children living in a household into a single AFDC assistance unit instead of treating these groups of children as two
separate units when calculating AFDC benefits. The Supreme
Court unanimously held that the California Rule does not
violate the constitution, stating that federal laws give great
latitude to the states to make rules governing their AFDC

245. Id. at 1294.
246. Id. at 1297 n.5.
247. Id. The economies of scale principle works as follows:
[Iln relation to housing, two people in the same household
need one dwelling, not two. Similarly, heating, a washing
machine, a motor car, a television and a telephone can all
be shared. Food and clothing cannot be shared at the
time of use but in different ways there can be economies
of scale: food purchased in bulk often costs less per helping than single helpings; clothing three children does not
cost three times as much as clothing one child since
many clothes can be passed on.
David Piachaud, The Definition and Measurement of Poverty and Inequality, in
CURRENT ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 105, 110 (Nicholas Barr et at
eds., 1993).
248. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1294.
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programs. 249 In addition, the Court recognized the economies
of scale that inhere in these types of living arrangements, and
thereby allowed states to cut their welfare costS. 250

Irma S. Jurado·

249. Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1298.
250. Id. at 1296, n.5.
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